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I. INTRODUCTION 
Broker-dealers and investment advisers, two types of financial service 
providers, play an important role in helping retail investors organize their 
finances, accumulate wealth, and manage their savings. In particular, 
investors rely on broker-dealers and investment advisers for investment 
The regulatory regime that governs the provision of investment advice to 
retail investors is crucial in assuring that legal obligations of investment 
advisers and broker-dealers match the expectation and needs of investors. 
Though broker-dealers and investment advisers are regulated extensively, 
the two financial professionals actually operate under different rules since 
they are subject to different standards under federal law when providing 
investment advice about securities and investment strategies.2 
Hence, the regulatory schemes for investment advisers and broker-
dealers are designed to protect investors through different approaches. In 
the United States, investment advisers must adhere to the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, which calls on advisers to perform fiduciary duties 
3 While broker-dealers, are governed 
for the most part by the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, specific Exchange Act rules and Self-Regulatory 
4 The rules based on the Exchange Act 
principles are constructed on principles of fairness and transparency.5 
Yet, retail investors generally are not aware of the regulatory 
differences between broker-dealer and investment advisers or their legal 
implications. Many investors are confused by the different standards of 
care that apply to broker-dealers and investment advisers.6 Hence, the 
confusion has been a source of great concern for both regulators and 
Congress.7 It has caused concern particularly because many financial 
further blurring the line between broker-dealer and investment adviser 
responsibilities.8 
 
2 See STAFF OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY ON 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT i (Jan. 2011) , 
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [hereinafter 913 STUDY] (discussing 
the different regulatory regimes of broker-dealers and investment advisers). 
3 Id. at iii. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at i. 
7 Id. 
8 913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 12. 
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Consequently, on June 5, 2019, the Securities and Exchange 
l-1 under the 
9 Regulation Best 
Interest established a new standard of conduct for broker-dealers meant to 
strengthen investor protection by: (1) reinforcing the obligations that apply 
to broker dealers when making an investment recommendation to retail 
customers; and (2) reducing the possible harm to retail investors from 
potential conflicts of interest.10 Through its new rule, the SEC sought to 
(i) educate retail customers about the services offered by broker-dealers 
and investment advisers to enable them to make informed decision; (ii) 
provide transparency with respect to the standards of conduct applicable 
to broker-dealers and investment advisers; and (iii) help fill the gap that 
currently exists in the level of protection provided to each regime.11 
This Article provides an overview of the rules and regulations 
governing the standard of conduct of broker-dealers and investment 
advisers and the impact Regulation Best Interest will have on the 
investment recommendations made to retail customers. Part I will 
introduce the regulatory differences between broker-dealers and 
investment advisers. Part II will look at the creation of the two regulatory 
frameworks governing broker-dealers and investment advisers and discuss 
try. Part III will 
introduce Regulation Best Interest and explain the different components 
to the rule. Finally, Part IV will look at what Regulation Best Interest 
attempts to achieve, the notable gaps in the regulation, and propose 
reasonable improvements to Regulation Best Interest.                                                                                     
II. PRIOR LAW AND PERSPECTIVE 
A. The Creation of the Regulatory Frameworks Governing Broker- 
Dealers and Investment Advisors 
The legal framework for determining the regulatory authority that 
governs broker- dealers and investment advisers begins with the 
development of the Federal Securities Regulation and creation of the 
SEC.12 Following the stock market crash of October 1929, public 
 
9 17 C.F.R. § 240.15l-1 (2019). 
10 Adopting Release 34-86031 (June 5, 2019) 4-5, www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/34-
86031.pdf [hereinafter Reg BI Release] (discussing the release of regulation best interest). 
11 David W. Soden & Cody J. Vitello, The New Standards for Investor Protection: An 
Analysis of Regulation Best Interest, Form CRS and Two Interpretations of the US 
Investment Advisers Act, IX 250 THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW, Sept. 19 2019. 
12 See generally Richard J. Kubiak, Comment: Off-Regulation: Examining the SEC s 
and the DOL s Dissonant Regulation of Broker-Dealers, 68 Emory L.J. 369, 376 (2018). 
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confidence in the markets plummeted and there was a general consensus 
needed to be restored.13 As a result, Congress enacted the Securities Act 
 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
14 The Securities Act together with the Exchange Act, 
which created the SEC, were designed to restore investor confidence in 
the capital markets by providing investors with more reliable information 
and clear rules of honest dealing.15 
The Securities Act had two basic objectives: (1) require that investors 
receive financial and other significant information concerning securities 
being offered for public sale; and (2) prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, 
and other fraud in the sale of securities.16 Further, a year later, the 
Exchange Act empowered the SEC with broad authority over all aspects 
of the securities industry.17 It included the power to register, regulate, and 
oversee brokerage firms, clearing agencies, stock exchanges, and SROs 
18 The Act also 
provided the SEC with disciplinary powers over regulated entities and 
their associates persons.19 Yet, these two Acts left out a group of 
professionals k  
Investment Advisers provide a wide range of investment advisory 
services to clients. From individuals and families looking to plan for 
retirement or grow their capital, clients seek  the services of investment 
advisers to help them evaluate their investment needs and provide ongoing 
financial planning advice for a fixed fee.20 Investment Advisers are 
21 Its 
22 
Investment Adviser employees under the Advisers Act are regulated as 
 
13 SEC, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html#org (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2019). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. (explaining that the Securities Act focused on companies publicly offering 
securities for investment dollars (primary market), while the Exchange Act focused on the 





19 SEC, supra note 13. 
20 913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 6-7. 
21 Id. (explaining that the Advisers Act resulted from a congressionally mandated study 
conducted by the Commission of investment companies, investment counsel, and 
investment advisory services). 
22 Id. (citing S. Rep No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960)). 
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ject to state statutes and 
provisions under the Act. 23 
Under the Advisers Act, a person falls within the meaning of an 
or analyses, regarding securities; (2) is in the business of providing such 
services; and (3) provides such services for compensation.24 An important 
thing to note is that the Advisers Act excludes from its definition of 
investment adviser any broker dealer: (i) whose investment advisory 
25 to the conduct of its business as a broker or 
services.26  Thus, a registered representative of a broker-dealer is entitled 
to rely on the broker-dealer exclusion of the Advisers Act if he or she is 
providing advisory services to customers within the scope of his or her 
employment as a broker-dealer.27 
Though the fiduciary duty to which advisers are subject to is not 
defined in the Advisers Act, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
Inc., the Supreme Court construed the Advisers Act Section 206(1) and 
(2) as establishing a federal fiduciary standard governing the conduct of 
investment advisers.28 As such, under the Advisers Act, a fiduciary 
standard applies to the investment ad 29 
The fiduciary standard requires that the investment adviser must satisfy 
e to avoid 
misleading clients.30 The duties of loyalty and care which require an 
adviser to serve the best interest of its clients are fundamental to the 
fiduciary standard. 
 
23 Id. at 14. 
24 Id. at 15. 
25 Id. at 15-16 (noting that solely incidental  elements amounts to recognition that 
broker-dealers give a certain amount of advice to their customers in the course of their 
regular business and it would be inappropriate to bring them within the scope of the 
Advisers Act). 
26 913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 15-16 (noting that special compensation  amounts to 
clear recognition that a broker or dealer is specially compensated for rendering advice 
should be considered an investment adviser and not excluded for the purview of the 
Advisers Act). 
27 Id. at 16. 
28 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,194 (1963) (noting that 
the Act s legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to impose enforceable 
fiduciary obligations). 
29 913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 22. 
30 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 193. 
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Under the duty of care, investment advisers are required to provide 
investment adv 31 As 
explained in more detail below, the duty of care is composed of various 
sub-duties. First, an investment adviser has a duty to provide advice that 
is in the best interest of the client.32 This means that an investment adviser 
33 To have a reasonable 
understand
34 Second, 
under the duty of care, an investment adviser has a duty to seek best 
selecting executing broker-dealers.35 Lastly, an investment adviser has a 
course of the agreed upon relationship.36 
Likewise, the duty of loyalty requires that an investment adviser not 
37 To meet its duty of 
loyalty, an investment adviser is required to make full and fair disclosure 
to its clients of all material facts relevant to the adviser-client relationship, 
including the capacity in which the firm is acting with respect to the advice 
provided, particularly when the firm is dually registered.38  An adviser 
must also make full and fair disclosure of any conflict of interest and 
39 
an adviser is required to present the client with specific facts so that the 
client is able to understand the material facts and any potential conflict of 
interest to make an informed decision as to whether or not to provide 
consent.40 Whether the disclosure is considered full and fair will depend 
upon various things such as the nature of the client, the scope of the 
services provided, and the material facts or conflicts.41 
 
31 See Adopting Release IA-5248 (July 12, 2019) 8, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf [hereinafter Fiduciary Interpretation] 
(discussing the Commission s interpretation regarding the standard of conduct for 
Investment Adviser s after Regulation Best Interest.) 
32 Id. at 12. 
33 Id. at 13, 15. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 19. 
36 Id. at 20. 
37 Fiduciary Interpretation, supra note 31 at 21. 
38 Id. at 22. 
39 Id. at 23. 
40 Id. at 24. 
41 Id. at 25. 
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Though most broker-dealers are not considered investment advisers 
under the Advisers Act, they are subject to additional regulatory oversight 
apart from the SEC. In 1938, the Maloney Act amended the Exchange Act 
-regulated voluntary national 
associations of broker- 42 
Consequently, FINRA was created to protect investors and strengthen 
market integrity through the regulation of its registered members.43 
44 Thus, by law, every firm 
and broker is required to register with FINRA.45 
FINRA established standards of conduct that broker-dealer members 
must adhere to when operating on behalf of clients.46 
2111, a broker-dealer could only recommend a transaction or investment 
47 
This means that a broker-dealer is required to choose from a selection of 
suita
objectives. 48 Yet, under this rule, unlike an investment adviser, a broker-
dealer is not required to act in the best interest of its retail customer.49 
B.  Overview of the Current Regulatory Landscape 
Today, many financial services firms offer both investment advisory 
and broker-dealer services, allowing their employees to be dually 
registered as  investment adviser and broker-dealer representatives.50 The 
dual registration model allows advisers to be affiliated with a broker dealer 
for commission-based securities while separately meeting the standards of 
 
42 Nat l Ass n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., (1997), 
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/Corporate/p009762. pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 
2019). 
43 Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority - FINRA (July 30, 2007), 
https://www.finra.org/media-center/news-releases/2007/nasd-and-nyse-member-
regulation-combine-form-financial-industry (last visited Feburary 24, 2021). 
44 Member Regulation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/member-regulation (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
45 Id. 
46 Rules and Guidance, FINRA,https://www.finra.org/industry/rules-and-guidance (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2019). 
47 See FINRA Manual, Contents: Rule 2111, FINRA (May 1, 2014), 
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2111 (last visited Nov. 3, 
2019) [hereinafter FINRA Manual]. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 12. 
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a fee-based investment adviser.51 Dual registration also allows firms to 
provide a variety of services to customers that would not be available if 
those entities were solely registered as investment advisers or broker-
dealers.52 Consequently, retail investors may have a number of different 
accounts at a financial services firm that are subject to investment adviser 
or broker-dealer regulations.53 Though having multiple accounts may 
bring certain benefits to investors such as taking advantage of the different 
forms of compensation paid to brokers-dealers and investment advisers, 
they also present conflicts and confusion regarding the different 
responsibilities dual registrants have towards retail investors.54 
When acting as dual registrants, investment advisers and broker-
dealers must adhere to different standards of conduct based on the role 
they have chosen to take when interacting with their investor clients.55 As 
previously mentioned, these standards of conduct are imposed by federal 
securities laws, and in the case of broker-dealers, by self-regulatory 
organizations, such as FINRA.56 Therefore, when a dually registered 
financial services 
he or she is in the business of providing investment advice for 
compensation, the Investment Advisers Act controls.57 
On the other hand, when a dual registrant acts solely as a broker-dealer 
when interacting with investor clients, the Advisers Act does not apply58 
since it excludes from the investment adviser definition any broker-dealer 
59 Thus, the disparity 
that exists between the two regulatory frameworks is a source of great 
concern for Congress regarding (1) the potential harm to retail customer 
resulting from broker-dealer recommendations where conflicts of interests 
exist, and (2) the insufficiency of broker-dealer regulatory requirements to 
address these conflicts.60 In other words, Congress is concerned that 
existing requirements do not require a broker-
be in the best interest of the retail customer. 
 
51 Sarah O  Brien, Booming: The new dually registered advisor model, CNBC (Mar. 16, 
2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/03/16/booming-the-new-dually-registered-advisor-
model.html. 






58 See FINRA Rules, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2019). 
59 Opinion of the General Counsel Relating to Section 202(a)(11)(C) of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2 (Oct. 28, 1940). 
60 913 STUDY, supra note 2, at 9. 
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III.  MAIN REGULATION AT HAND 
A. The Emergence of Regulation Best Interest 
On January 2011, the SEC conducted a study on investment advisers 
and broker-dealers as required by Section 913 of the Dodd Frank Wall 
61 
Section 913 requires that the SEC conduct a wide-ranging study regarding 
gaps or deficiencies in the regulation of broker-dealers and investment 
advisers.62 Since these firms often perform similar functions but are 
regulated differently, Congress set forth key items the SEC must consider 
63 In doing so, Congress gave the SEC new rulemaking 
authority.64 
address the gaps in the regulation had a gap of its own-a gap between the 
issues the study found and the tools the SEC had been provided to solve 
them.65 
expand the fiduciary rule for investment advisers under the Employee 
66 
efforts to create a Fiduciary Rule came to a halt when the Fifth Circuit 
Court concluded that the DOL had overreached its mission.67 In response 
-1 decision, the 
SEC stepped up and proposed a new rule 15l-1 under the Exchange Act 
on April 18, 2018.68 
 
61 See generally id. 
62 Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. § 913. 
124 Stat. 1376, 1824 (2010) (mandating study and rulemaking regarding obligations of 
brokers, dealers, and investment advisers). 
63 Id. at § 913(b)-(b)(1). 
64 Id. at § 913(c) (explaining that the SEC could commence a rulemaking, as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of retail customers to address the 
legal or regulatory standards of care for broker-dealers, investment advisers, and their 
associated persons). 
65 Id. (noting that in giving the SEC new rulemaking authority, Congress recognized the 
need of additional legislation to reform the regulations of broker dealers and investment 
advisers). 
66 Id. (explaining that the DOL s Fiduciary Rule, also known as the Conflict of Interest  
rule, stated that advisers must give conflict free advice on retirement accounts, putting their 
client s needs ahead of their own potential compensation). 
67 Alessandra Malito, The fiduciary rule is officially dead. What its fate means to you, 
MARKETWATCH (June 25, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/is-the-fiduciary-
rule-dead-or-alive-what-its-fate-means-to-you-2018-03-16. 
68 Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 9. 
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sought to materialize the broad rule-making authority given to the SEC by 
the Dodd Frank Act. 
Regulation Best Interest proposed enhancements to the broker-dealer 
standard of conduct when making recommendations to retail customers.69 
Specifically, the regulation established an express best interest obligation 
that would require all broker-dealers and associated persons, to act in the 
best interest of the retail customer, at the time of recommending a security 
transaction or investment strategy.70 Under this new regulation, a broker-
dealer could not place its financial interest ahead of the interest of its 
customers.71 This new standard of conduct established by Regulation Best 
Interest emerges from key fiduciary principles, including those that apply 
to investment advisers, yet does not impose a formal fiduciary standard for 
broker-dealers.72 Rather, it requires that whether a retail investor chooses 
a broker-dealer or an investment adviser (or both), the investor will be 
entitled to receive an investment recommendation that is in his or her best 
interest based on his or her  financial needs and investment objectives.73 
In response to its proposed release, the SEC received over 6,000 
comment letters from individual investors, financial services firms, state 
securities regulators, among others.74 Despite various concerns and 
proposed recommendations to the rule, on June 5, 2019, the SEC voted 3-
1 to approve a package of rules and regulations that would enhance the 
-dealers 
and investment advisers.75 The rule became effective on September 10, 
2019, and requires compliance by June 30, 2020.76 
B. A Broker-  
Regulation Best Interest is composed of two parts: (1) an overall 
provision setting forth that a broker-
best interest and cannot place its own interest ahead of the retail customers 





72 Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 68. 
73 Id. 
74 See Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation Best Interest, 
Release No. 34-83062 1 (April 18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/34-
86031.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2019) [hereinafter Proposel Rule]. 
75 Soden & Vitello, supra note 11. 
76 Reg BI Interest, supra note 10, at 2. 
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General Obligation standard.77 The General Obligation is satisfied only if 
the broker-dealer complies with four specific sub-component obligations, 
which include: the (i) Disclosure Obligation, (ii) Care Obligation, (iii) 
Conflict of Interest Obligation, and (iv) Compliance Obligation.78 Thus, a 
violation of any of the four sub-component obligations will lead to a 
violation of the General Obligation.79 It is important to note that intent is 
not required to establish a violation of the General Obligation.80 
or at the time of [a] recommendation, reasonably disclose to the retail 
customer, in writing, the material facts relating to the scope and terms of 
the relationship with the retail customer and all material conflicts of 
81 Pursuant to this 
obligation, the Reg BI Release noted that material facts include: (1) 
whether the broker-dealer was acting in a broker, dealer, or associated 
person capacity with respect to the recommendation; (2) fees and costs that 
those fees are deducted (e.g., on a per transaction basis or quarterly); (3) 
type and scope of services,82 and (4) conflicts of interest the customer 
should know about.83 Though the form and manner of disclosure is flexible 
under Regulation Best Interest, broker-dealers and investment advisers are 
also required to deliver to retail investors the Relationship Summary.84 The 
Relationship Summary is considered the initial layer of disclosure, with 
the Disclosure Obligation reflecting more specific and additional detailed 
 
77 Id. at 13 (discussing the enhancements to standard of conduct that applies when 
broker-dealers make recommendations to retail customers, specifically the proposal of 
Regulation Best Interest). 
78 Id. at 15 (explaining that although Regulation Best Interest identifies specified 
obligations with which a broker-dealer must comply in order to meet its General 
Obligation, compliance with each of the component obligation of Regulation Best Interest 
will be principles-based. In other words, whether a broker-dealer has acted in a retail 
customer s best interest will turn on an objective assessment of the fact and circumstances 
at the time the recommendation is made). 
79 See id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 130. 
82 See id. at 14 (noting that type and scope of services includes the following examples 
of facts that are deemed to be material and require disclosure: (1) whether a broker-dealer 
had material limitations on the securities; (2) whether a broker-dealer provides account 
monitoring and if so, its frequency; (3) whether a broker-dealer has any new account 
balance requirements; (4) the general basis or strategy  for a recommendation; (5) the 
general risks associated with a particular recommendation). 
83 Id. 
84 See id. at 134 (explaining that the Relationship Summary provides information about 
the relationship and services offered as well as fees and costs that the retail investor will 
pay). 
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layers of disclosure.85 Accordingly, the Disclosure Obligation encourages 
investors to ask questions and request additional sources of information 
when needed.86 
Second, the Care Obligation requires that a broker-dealer, when 
making a recommendation of any security transaction or investment 
the Care Obligation.87 These three components are the following: (1) a 
Reasonable- Basis Component, which requires a broker-dealer to 
understand the potential risks, rewards, and costs associated with a 
recommendation could be in the best interest of at least some retail 
customers; (2) a Customer-Specific Component, which requires that a 
broker-dealer must have reasonable basis to believe the recommendation 
-Care Component, 
which requires that a broker-dealer must have reasonable basis to believe 
best interest, when viewed in isolation, is not excessive.88 The Care 
Obligation is considered the heart of Regulation Best Interest and was 
intended  to incorporate and enhance existing suitability requirements 
applicable to broker-dealers under the federal securities laws.89 
Third, the Conflict of Interest Obligation requires a broker-dealer to 
establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures that are 
reasonably designed to identify and address  the effect of the broker-
90 At a minimum, a 
broker-dealer is required to (1) disclose or eliminate, all conflict of 
interests associated with a recommendation and (2) identify the material 
facts associated with that conflict in order to establish specific 
requirements with respect to the policies and procedures for the mitigation 
and elimination of certain conflicts.91  These policies and procedures are 
designed to address potential conflicts of interest and broker-dealers must 
disclose the material limitations of the menu of securities when the conflict 




87 Id. at 245. 
88 See id. at 245. 
89 See id. 
90 Soden & Vitello, supra note 11 (explaining that this obligation achieves greater 
consistency with the treatment of conflicts under the Advisers Act since it requires that a 
broker-dealer expose all conflicts of interest through full and fair disclosure). 
91 Id. 
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eliminated.92 In doing so, the Conflict of Interest Obligation is intended to 
reduce the information asymmetry that exists between a retail customer 
and broker dealer with respect to the bro
that may have an effect on the recommendation provided to the retail 
customer.93 Thus, by having a process in place to identify and address 
conflict of interests at the time of recommendation, retail customers can 
make a better assessment of the efficiency of the recommendation they 
receive.94 
Fourth, the Compliance Obligation requires in addition to the policies 
and procedures required by the Conflict of Interest Obligation, that broker-
dealers establish, maintain, and enforce policies and procedures 
Interest.95 
whole by not only addressing conflicts of interests but also complying with 
the Disclosure and Care Obligations.96 In addition, the Compliance 
 with the 
operations of the firm and the types of businesses in which the firm 
97 Though the SEC does not mandate specific requirements to 
the Compliance Obligation, a reasonably designed compliance program 
n of non-compliance; (2) 
98 
Additionally, in addition to its General Obligation and sub-component 
-making 
and record k 99  The requirements include a record of 
all information collected from and provided to the retail customer when 
recommending a security or investment strategy and retention of all 
records and account information for at least six years.100 Examples of 
 
92 Id. 
93 Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 568. 
94 Id. at 574. 
95 Id. at 358. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 360. 
98 Id. 
99 Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 361 (specifying minimum requirements with respect 
to the records that broker-dealers must make, and how these records must be kept). 
100 Id. at 369 (noting that the six-year minimum requirement is six years after the earlier 
of the date the account was closed or the date on which the information was replaced or 
outdated). 
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customers.101 A broker-dealer does not need to maintain record on a 
-by-recommendatio
explain in general terms the process by which the firm determines what 
process would be applied to a particular recommendation.102 
Finally, Regulation Best Interest has also incorporated Form CRS as 
part of its requirements.103 Form CRS is a new question and answer, open-
ended disclosure document that helps address investor confusion about the 
nature of their relationship with investment professionals.104 Form CRS is 
intended to provide retail investors with simple, easy to understand 
information about: (1) the types of services offered; (2) applicable fees the 
retail customer may pay; (3) the legal standard of conduct applicable to 
the broker-dealer; (4) financial professional compensation; and (5) any 
reportable disciplinary history the firm has.105 Form CRS must be written 
Best Interest requires that broker-dealers complete Form CRS and file it 
electronically by June 30, 2020.106 
C. What Regulation Best Interest Attempts to Achieve 
Prior to June 5, 2019, when that SEC voted to adopt Regulation Best 
Interest, broker-dealers were subject to a suitability standard under FINRA 
Rule 2111.107 -dealers [and 
their] associated persons have reasonable basis to believe that a 
recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or 
securities [was] suitable for the customer, based on information obtained 
through reasonable [due] diligence . . 
108 In its decision to implement Regulation Best 
Interest, the SEC sought to enhance the quality and transparency of 
investors relationship with broker-dealers and investment advisers by 
 
101 See Soden and Vitello, supra note 11. 
102 Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 204-05. 
103 See Adopting Release 34-86032 (June 5, 2019) 1, 
https:// www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/34-86032.pdf [hereinafter Form CRS Release] 
(discussing Form CRS Relationship Summary and Amendments to Form ADV). 
104 Id. at 5. 
105 Id. at 1. 
106 Id. at 28.  
107 See generally Reg BI Release, supra note 10.; see also The SEC Approves Regulation 
Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, KING & SPALDING (June 27, 2019), 
https://www.kslaw.com/news-and-insights/the-sec-approves-regulation-best-interest-the-
broker-dealer-standard-of-conduct (explaining how the SEC approved Regulation Best 
Interest by a 3-1 vote, with Commissioner Robert Jackson dissenting). 
108 FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability) FAQ, available at https://www.finra.org/rules-
guidance/key-topics/suitability/faq (last visited Feb. 24, 2021). 




Under Regulation Best Interest, broker-dealers and their associated 
persons are required to act in the best interest of the retail customer at the 
time an investment recommendation is made.110 Broker-dealers are also 
required to address conflicts of interest by establishing procedures that are 
reasonably designed to identify and fairly disclose material facts about 
potential conflicts of interest, and in certain cases are prompted to mitigate 
or eliminate the conflict.111 As a result, Regulation Best Interest is 
expected to enhance the efficiency of the recommendations broker-dealers 
make to retail customers since retail customers will be able to better 
analyze the recommendations received and make informed decisions.112 
Yet, it is important to note that Regulation Best Interest specifically 
stated that it would not apply to investment advice provided to a retail 
customer by a dual-registrant when acting in the capacity of an investment 
adviser, even if the retail investor has a brokerage relationship with the 
dual-registrant.113 
mine the capacity in which a 
dual-registrant makes a recommendation.114 Specific factors would 
include: (1) the type of account; (2) how the account is described; (3) the 
type of compensation; and (4) the extent to which the dual-registrant made 
clear to the customer the capacity in which it was acting.115 Thus, the 
ificant gap in the standard 
of conduct of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Notable Gaps Left by Regulation Best Interest 
and a broker- lation Best Interest sound very 
 
109 Reg BI Release, supra note 10 at 373. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 374. 
112 Id. (noting that [w]hile a suitable recommendation must take into account the 
elements of a retail customer s investment profile that make securities transactions or an 
investment strategy efficient for that particular retail customer, this requirement for 
suitability may not always lead to an efficient result for the retail customer ). 
113 Form CRS Release, supra note 103, at 67-69. 
114 Id. at 71. 
115 See generally id. at 67-78. 




Regulation Best Interest requires that a broker-dealer act in the best 
when making securities recommendations to its retail customers.117 
However, the general obligation of putting 
Obligati 118 On the other hand, the Investment Adviser Act is based on 
of a client.119 Though similar, these two obligations can be interpreted 
quite differently, particularly because Regulation Best Interest does not 
include an explicit duty of loyalty.120 Thus, the lines are blurred as to when 




First, unlike the Advisers Act, Regulation Best Interest limits broker- 
tment discretion. For example, 
though the SEC believes that when a broker-dealer has discretion over a 
an investment adviser under the Advisers Act, the SEC has taken the 
position 
- 121 If a broker-
is considered solely incidental, then it excluded from the definition of an 
 
116 Anna Young Black, Richard T. Choi, Ann Began Furman, Thomas C. Lauerman & 
Chip Lunde, Unpacking the SEC s Regulation Best Interest Package, THE NATIONAL 
REVIEW (2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/unpacking-sec-s-regulation-best-
interest-package (last visit Dec. 27, 2019). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Fiduciary Interpretation, supra note 31, at 8. 
120 Black et al., supra note 116 (noting that a duty of loyalty requires that an investment 
adviser provide frequent advice and monitoring that is consistent with the adviser-client 
relationship). 
121 See Soden & Vitello, supra note 11. 
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e that a broker-dealer owe a 
fiduciary duty to its retail customer. 122 
Though the SEC will consider the totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether an advice was solely incidental, it has provided certain 
examples of temporary or limited investment discretion.123 The SEC also 
requires that a broker-dealer not receive special compensation for such 
services. 124 Examples of temporary or limited investment advice include: 
(1) discretion as to the price or time at which to execute an order, (2) 
discretion, on an infrequent basis, to purchase or sell a security when a 
customer is unavailable, (3) discretion to purchase or sell securities to 
satisfy margin requirements, (4) discretion to purchase or sell a security 
limited by specific parameters established by the customer, among other 
things, (5) discretion as to cash management, and (6) discretion to 
purchase a bond with a specified credit rating and maturity date .125 
Consequently, if these situations apply, a broker-dealer will not owe a 
fiduciary duty to its retail customer. Hence, under Regulation Best Interest, 
instances likes the ones mentioned above limit a broker-
obligations towards its retail customers. 
2. No Duty to Provide Ongoing Advice and Monitoring 
Second, under Regulation Best Interest, a broker-
do not extend beyond a particular recommendation since a broker-
126 Hence, Regulation Best Interest does not require a 
-
directed or unsolicited orders.127 This gap is particularly important because 
the duty to monit
Unlike, broker-dealers, investment advisers under the Advisers Act have 
a duty to provide advice and monitoring that is relatively extensive and 
consistent with the nature of the relationship. In doing so, investment 
 
122 Id. 
123 Adopting Release IA-5249 (June 5, 2019) 17, 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ ia-5249.pdf [hereinafter, Solely Incidental 
Interpretation Release]. 
124 Id. at 2. 
125 Id. at 17. 
126 See Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 60. 
127 Fiduciary Interpretation, supra note 31, at 10 (explaining that the specific obligations 
that flow from the adviser s fiduciary duty depend upon what functions the adviser, as 
agent, has agreed to assume for the client, its principal. For example the obligation of an 
adviser providing comprehensive, discretionary advice in an ongoing relationship with a 
retail client . . . [is] different from the obligations of an adviser [providing advice] to a 
registered investment company or private fund where the contract defines the scope of the 
relationship ). 
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advisers are required to review the performance of the account, make 
appropriate changes to the portfolio, and evaluate whether a program type 
continues to be in the best interest of the client.128 Though a broker-dealer 
can agree to provi
review of the account without a recommendation to sell is considered an 
129 
3. The Continued Existence of Broker-Dealer Compensation 
Model 
Third, the sustained existence of a transaction-based (e.g., 
commission) compensation structure for broker-dealers under Regulation 
Best Interest, provides a continued incentive to a broker-dealer to seek its 
own compensation or other financial interest at the expense of the 
customer  to whom it is making investment recommendations.130 Though 
-dealer to recommend the 
natives that might exist 
customer.131 Further, under Regulation Best Interest, the SEC does not 
require an associated person of a broker-
product on a broker- 132 
4.  
Fourth, it is important to note that while Regulation Best Interest seeks 
to enhance the efficiency of the recommendations broker-dealers make to 
retail customers, many retail customers may not always have the 
investment knowledge or time to identify efficient strategies on their 
own.133  In addition, investors may have limited access to information that 
would allow them to properly evaluate investment choices.134  This is due 
to the fact that the efficiency of an investment recommendation depends 
on various factors, such as : (1) the menu of investment products and 
strategies that a broker-dealer  and its associated persons consider when 
making an investment recommendation, (2) the return and costs of the 
 
128 See Barbara Black, Brokers and Advisers  What s in a Name?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 31, 38 (2005). 
129 Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 13. 
130 See id. at 6-7. 
131 Black et al., supra note 116. 
132 Id. 
133 Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 378. 
134 Id. 
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constraints.135 
provide more information to investors and raise the standard of conduct 
for broker-dealers, may fall short since retail customers will likely still 
follow a broker- ing an informed decision.136 
B. Investor and State Response to Regulation Best Interest 
Regulation Best Interest is expected to have important implications on 
broker-
customers. Yet, its impact on consumer protection remains uncertain 
137 As 
Commissioner Jackson, the sole dissenter to the rule explained, 
st Interest] fails to require that investor interest come first, 
138 
relies on a weak mix of measures that are unlikely to make a difference in 
139 
confusion and criticism has heightened. Seven states and the District of 
Columbia have sued the SEC and agency Chairman Jay Clayton to 
overturn Regulation Best Interest.140 Attorney Generals for the states of 
New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Mexico, and 
Oregon have filed lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York seeking to vacate Regulation Best Interest.141 In the 
Complaint, states allege that the SEC exceeded its statutory authority in 
 
135 Id. at 380-381. 
136 See id. at 378. 
137 The Investment Management Practice, SEC Adopts Rules & Interpretative Guidance 




139 Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Statement on Final Rules Governing Investment Advice, 
SEC.GOV (June 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson-
060519-iabd. 
140 Greg Iiacurci, SEC Sued by Seven States to Kill Reg BI Investment-Advice Rule, 
INVESTMENT NEWS (Sep. 10, 2019), 
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190910/FREE/190919999/sec-sued-by-
seven-states-to-kill-reg-bi-investment-advice-rule. 
141 Id. ( Massachusetts, New Jersey and Nevada have proposed rules to require a 
fiduciary standard of care for broker-dealers. ). 
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violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.142 The Administrative 
Procedure Act governs the process by which federal agencies such as the 
SEC, develop and issue regulations.143  More specifically, plaintiffs allege 
that the SEC failed to implement a uniform standard of conduct.144 In 
doing so, the SEC increased the risk of harm to retail investors because 
they cannot always differentiate the proper standard of conduct that 
applies when they get an investment recommendation from a broker-dealer 
vs. a registered investment adviser.145 
Furthermore, a few weeks after Regulation Best Interest was adopted, 
the U.S House of Representative passed legislation prohibiting the SEC 
from implementing and enforcing Regulation Best Interest when a broker-
dealer is making an investment recommendation to a retail customer.146 In 
addition, various state legislatures and state securities regulators have 
taken steps to adopt a uniform fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers at the local level.147 So far, states like Massachusetts, 
Nevada, New Jersey, and New York have all taken steps to require greater 
levels of disclosure or have sought to impose a uniform fiduciary standard 
on all investment professionals.148 
Yet, one important issue left unaddressed by the SEC is whether state 
fiduciary rules would preempt the federally promulgated Regulation Best 
Interest.149 In its passing of Regulation Best Interest, the SEC did not take 
a position regarding preemption and chose to defer that issue to the judicial 
branch.150 preemptive effect of Regulation Best 
 
142 Id. 
143 See Promoting the Rule of Law Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil 
Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication, 84 Fed. Reg. 55239 (Oct. 19, 2019) 
(explaining that the APA includes requirements for publishing notices of proposed and 
final rulemakings in the Federal Register and provides opportunities for the public to 
comment on notices of proposed rulemaking). 
144 Iacuri, supra note 140. 
145 Id. (explaining that investor confusion is caused by the fact that the rule makes it easier 
for brokers to market themselves as trusted advisers  while still being able to give 
conflicted advice). 
146 Mirella DeRose et al., Regulation Best Interest: Updates and Developments, JD 
SUPRA (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/regulation-best-interest-
updates-and-97361/ (explaining that the legislation passed is a funding bill for various 
federal agencies, including the SEC. The bill includes an amendment that would prohibit 
regulators from moving forward with the controversial Regulation Best Interest.). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. (clarifying that the fiduciary standards these states seek to impose include requiring 
annual table of fees and services to advisory clients in order to increase transparency for 
retail investors and imposing duties of care and loyalty to broker-dealers). 
149 See id. 
150 Daniel Nathan, Daniel Streim, Nicholas Peterson & Trace Schmeltz, The SEC s 
Regulation Best Interest: How to Prepare for the New Standard of Conduct, A.B.A. (June 
19, 2019), 
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Interest on any state law governing the relationship between regulated 
entities and their customers will be determined in future judicial 
151 Thus, 
much remains unknown as to how Regulation Best Interest will be 
implemented and enforced by states and self-regulatory organizations like 
FINRA. 
C. Thinking Ahead: Reasonable Solutions to Regulation Best 
Interest  
While the fate of Regulation Best Interest is unclear, the potential June 
2020 compliance deadline is quickly approaching, and investor confusion 
persists as to the different standards of care between broker- dealers and 
broker-dealer standard of conduct by aligning a broker-
enforcement and teeth to hold broker-dealers to a best interest standard. 
Particularly because the rule fails to expand on consumer protections and 
add clarity to the broker vs. advisor roles. 
Yet, in the midst of  the grey areas left by the Regulation Best Interest, 
firms should work diligently together to achieve a successful compliance 
framework.152 By developing policies and procedures that provide a higher 
standard of care to their investors, firms can not only educate their 
investors on the differences between broker-dealers and investment 
advisers responsibilities but can also come one step closer towards 
satisfying a 153 In doing so, firms are 
 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/securities/practice/2019/how-
to-prepare-for-new-standard-of-conduct-regulation-best-interest/ (advising that states that 
have extended fiduciary obligations to broker-dealers should observe the higher state 
standard until the judiciary branch determines whether Regulation Best Interest displaces 
those state laws). 
151 Reg BI Release, supra note 10, at 515 n. 1163 (explaining that there are unknown 
factors which keep the SEC from deciding whether Regulation Best Interest should 
preempt state law such as: (1) the final language in any proposed state legislation; (2) 
whether the language would constitute the type of law, rule, or regulation that is expressly 
preempted by the securities law; and (3) whether, if there was any preemption, that 
preclusion of state law would have any positive or negative effects on investors when 
compared with the effects of Regulation Best Interest). 
152 Ghillaine Reid and Kurt Wolfe, Firms Should Stay Course Amid New Broker Standard 
Suits, LAW360 (Sep. 25, 2019, 3:12 PM), 
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/92c04248-9a52-4171-8fa7-
2ef327a3bf63/?context=1000516 (advising that for firms who compliance efforts are 
underway should stay in the course of compliance regardless of the current lawsuits seeking 
to set the regulation aside). 
153 Id. (explaining that while the SEC and states have not agreed to a uniform fiduciary 
standard, by designing and implementing policies and procedures that comply with the 
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likely to conform their conduct as closely as possible to the Regulation 
Best Interest standard.154 
Moreover, while the SEC refused to provide further guidance as to 
initiated by FINRA might be a viable solution towards addressing the gaps 
left by Regulation Best Interest.155 For instance, the campaign could 
provide more details as to when a broker- ered 
SEC 
mentioned it would apply a totality of the circumstances test, having a 
more comprehensive explanation as to what the limits are, can help 
investors decipher when a fiduciary duty is owed to them. The campaign 
can also help educate investors as to when and under what circumstances 
a broker-dealer is required to monitor an account. Doing so would help 
a dual registrant must do when providing investment advice. 
Further, while the SEC has failed to clarify whether state fiduciary 
rules would preempt the federally promulgated Regulation Best Interest, a 
workable solution might be for states to follow state promulgated fiduciary 
standards since they impose a higher ethical duty for broker-dealers when 
compared to Regulation Best Interest.156 If states with fiduciary rules 
follow them, they will certainly meet the four obligation under Regulation 
Best Interest which include: (i) Disclosure Obligation, (ii) Care 
Obligation, (iii) Conflict of Interest Obligation, and (iv) Compliance 
Obligation. Consequently, it is unlikely that broker-dealers in such states 
will encounter a problem for choosing to put their state fiduciary rules first. 
Likewise, another feasible solution might be for more states to enforce a 
state fiduciary rule. Doing so would help narrow the gap that exists in retail 
-dealers and investment 
advisers. Many states such as Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, and 
New York have already done so at a local level and are one step closer 
towards achieving a uniform fiduciary standard.157 
 
most restrictive regulatory requirements, firms can establish a single internal standard that 
applies to all securities transactions where the broker-dealer or investment adviser 
recommends securities or investment strategies to retail investors). 
154 Id. 
155 Daniel Nathan, Daniel Streim, Nicholas Peterson & Trace Schmeltz, supra note 150 
(clarifying that in its adoption of Regulation Best Interest, the SEC largely left the term 
best interest undefined since it solely explained the four obligations under the rule). 
156 See Ross Jordan, Thinking Before Rulemaking: Why The SEC Should Think Twice 
Before Imposing a Uniform Fiduciary Standard on Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 491, 505 (2012). 
157 DeRose et al., supra note 146. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The problem of conflicting standards for broker-dealers and 
investment advisers has troubled the financial services industry for way 
too long. For years, main street investors have been left unprotected and 
confused about the different legal obligations and standard of conduct 
broker-dealers and investment advisers carry when making investment 
recommendations. As financial services firms turned to a dually 
registration model, investor confusion widened.  Dual registration allowed 
firms to offer both advisory and broker-dealer services to investors while 
their employees adhered to different standards of conduct based on the 
services provided. Accordingly, the dually registered model further 
blurred the lines that existed between investment advisers and broker-
dealer responsibilities. 
In its decision to pass Regulation Best Interest, the SEC sought to 
finally put investors first. The Commission adopted a package of rules and 
interpretations that would enhance the quality and transparency of retail 
-dealers and investment advisers. The 
regulation brought legal requirements and mandated disclosures for 
broker-dealers and investment advisers in line with reasonable investor 
expectations. By enhancing the current suitability standard under FINRA 
Rule 2111, the SEC hoped to improve the efficiency of the 
recommendations broker-
initiative to choose Main Street over Wall Street fell short. 
Though Regulation Best Interest requires that a broker-dealer must act 
nd cannot place its interest ahead of 
its customers, its impact on investor protection remains uncertain. While 
broker-dealers have until June 30, 2020, to comply, the adopted rule 
remains far too ambiguous and has increased investor confusion. In its 
adoption of Regulation Best Interest did not explain how a broker-dealer 
must go about complying with the rule. The rule also did not address 
whether Regulation Best Interest would preempt state fiduciary rules. 
Since many states have already extended fiduciary obligations to broker-
dealers, whether Regulation Best Interest will displace those state laws is 
likely to be determined through litigation. 
quickly approaching, possible feasible solutions include: (i) firms working 
together to achieve a compliance framework by developing policies and 
procedures that achieve a higher standard of care for broker-dealer; (ii) 
FINRA providing further guidance to firms and investors as to what 
constitutes 
to follow their state fiduciary rules despite the Regulation Best Interest; 
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and (iv) promoting other states to implement local/ state fiduciary rules. 
Thus, by implementing the mentioned solutions, states, firm, and 
regulators could once and for all help narrow the gap that currently exists 
between broker-
expectations. 
 
